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Abstract 
This study estimates the impact of product market regulations on Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) and distinguishes between its short run and long run effects. It also 
explores whether regulatory changes exert a nonlinear influence on TFP growth. The 
obtained empirical evidence reveals that in the long run lower regulations exert a 
significantly positive effect on TFP of OECD countries. Short run effects of regulation 
are not always statistically significant. The influence of regulatory changes is higher in 
countries with high levels of regulation. Also, the damaging effects of regulation are 
more intense in countries with low technology gaps. These results hold across a wide 
array of econometric specifications and variables that measure regulation and TFP.  
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1 Introduction 
Recent decades have seen a remarkable increase in the number of product market 
reforms in the OECD area. Such reforms have been carried out in many countries albeit 
from a different starting point and to a different degree. Table 1 depicts that OECD 
countries have reformed their product markets significantly, though some of them still 
remain more liberalized than others. 
Τhe main reason for promoting changes in product markets has been the 
strengthening of competition and further boost of productivity and competitiveness of 
countries. The key question that arises is whether and to what extent have such changes 
been successful in countries. Although it is a common belief that policies favoring 
competition raise productivity, the empirical literature has not yet reached to a complete 
understanding on their influence on growth. Their impact across economies with 
varying characteristics is an issue that still remains unresolved. Also the existing 
literature has relied so far on the assumption of homogeneity, without distinguishing 
long run from short run dynamics and without considering feedback effects between 
variables. 
This paper contributes in two directions. First, it examines the impact of product 
market liberalization policies on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) by distinguishing 
between its long run and short run effects. Second, it explores whether such influences 
depend on country specific characteristics such as the existing level of regulation and 
the size of the technology gap.  
The results of this study are based on cross country data for 23 OECD countries 
in 1975-2011. They are clearly in favor of a negative long run influence of regulation on 
TFP growth. In the short run, the growth impact of regulation is not always statistically 
significant, implying that its effects on productivity can be realized after an initial 
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adjustment period. Importantly, it is shown that the existing regulatory conditions is an 
important element for assessing their productivity impact. Specifically, the influence of 
regulatory changes is higher in countries with already high levels of regulation. Also, 
the harmful effects of regulation are more intense in countries with low technology 
gaps. These results are validated across a wide array of econometric specifications and 
variables that measure regulation and TFP. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, the findings of the relevant 
theoretical and literature are briefly discussed. Section 3 presents the data and provides 
measures of TFP growth. In Section 4 the econometric results are discussed. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes.     
 
2 Theory and empirical literature 
Economic theory suggests that competition in product markets results to higher 
productivity through reallocation of markets shares to most efficient businesses. This 
can be accomplished by forcing exit of less productive firms and by allowing more 
efficient ones to enter the market. Although early Schumpeterian arguments and 
endogenous growth models argue that innovation is negatively associated with higher 
competition (Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1992), 
recent neo-Schumpeterian analyzes have questioned this view by arguing that, as 
competitive pressures increase the incumbent firms engage in more innovation in order 
to preserve their market shares. Aghion et al. (2005) showed the existence of an inverse 
U relationship between competition and innovation.
 
At a low level of competition, an 
increase in competition in the market increases innovation, since the escape competition 
effect dominates the Schumpeterian effect and pushes firms in the industry to innovate 
in order to avoid losing market shares. At higher levels of competition, the 
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Schumpeterian effect is more powerful than the escape competition effect, as the post 
innovation rents become very low.  
Similarly, competition affects more the growth of countries or industries which 
are close to the world technology frontier, in which the escape competition effect is 
more likely to dominate. In contrast, in economies being far away from the productivity 
frontier, the Schumpeterian effect is likely to prevail and discourage innovation activity. 
Aghion et al. (2006) noticed that the post war catch up of European economies relative 
to the US slowed down as the relative technology gap narrowed. They stressed the need 
for policies in favour of higher competition, which would affect positively innovation 
and growth. In the same spirit, Acemoglu et al. (2006) assumed that innovation 
becomes important for growth when a country reaches the technology frontier.  They 
argued that in more advanced countries where the possibilities for further growth 
through factor accumulation have been exhausted, innovation becomes the main vehicle 
for growth. Therefore, to the extent that a higher innovation rate depends on 
competition, countries should adopt policies towards higher liberalization. Similar 
arguments in favor of a positive influence of lower regulations on technology adoption 
have been offered by Parente and Prescott (1994), Aghion and Schankerman (2004) and 
Alesina et al. (2005). 
Most findings of the relevant empirical literature indicate that lower regulations 
in markets are positively associated with productivity growth. The OECD industry level 
evidence of Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) showed that entry liberalization involves 
significant productivity gains in all countries, irrespective their position vis-a-vis the 
technology frontier. When liberalization was interacted with the technology gap, 
productivity gains were higher in manufacturing industries of countries which were far 
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from the technology frontier. Similarly, Aghion et al. (2004) have shown that more 
liberalized entry conditions have led to faster TFP growth of UK firms and improved 
aggregate productivity performance. Inklaar et al. (2008) found that entry liberalization 
has been beneficial for productivity growth only in telecommunication industries, while 
Aghion et al. (2009) established that market rigidities are more harmful for growth of 
countries close to the technological frontier. 
More recent evidence indicates that the output elasticity of motorway 
infrastructures is lower in countries with a high degree of regulation in the road 
transport sector (Bottasso and Conti 2010).  Barone and Cingano (2011) also show that 
lower regulation in the service sector is important for growth of manufacturing 
industries that use services more intensively. Bartelsman et al. (2013) used firm level 
data to show that market distortions result in misallocation of resources and account for 
a large part of cross country productivity differences. Bourles et al. (2013) established 
that anticompetitive regulations in upstream industries have curbed productivity growth 
of OECD industries and showed that these effects are stronger in industries which are 
close to the productivity frontier. Similarly, Buccirossi et al. (2013) established a 
positive effect of friendly competition policies on industry level TFP growth of twelve 
OECD countries. Finally, Dimelis and Papaioannou (2015) clearly indicated that 
increases in the degree of entry regulation are negatively associated with industry level 
TFP growth of south European countries. 
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3 Data and TFP growth estimates 
3.1 Market regulation data  
The dataset of this paper includes annual data across 23 OECD countries: namely: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA during 1975-2011. Market 
regulation is measured by the time varying OECD product market regulation index (see 
Koske et al. 2013). This index includes a wide array of regulatory provisions in seven 
network service industries which are: telecommunications, electricity, gas, post, rail, air 
and road transports. This indicator covers the extent of entry limitations, state control, 
price control as well as the degree of public ownership in these industries and receives 
values from 0 to 6, with higher values reflecting a higher degree of regulation. 
This index can be used as a measure for the economy wide regulatory 
environment, since it includes sectors in which much anti-competitive regulation is 
concentrated (Conway et al. 2006). Also, services produced in these sectors constitute 
an essential input for most sectors of the rest part of the economy and therefore 
regulatory provisions in these industries affect the cost of production and aggregate 
level productivity performance.  
Table 1 shows how this indicator has evolved between 1975 and 2011, across 
the 23 OECD countries of the sample. It is obvious that in 1975 almost all OECD 
economies were heavily regulated, with the exception of the USA. However, the degree 
of regulation started to decrease considerably in all OECD countries during the 90s with 
different degrees and to a different extent. The most liberal countries in 2011 were the 
 7 
UK, Germany and Australia. On the other hand, the most regulated economies were 
Luxemburg, New Zealand and Greece.    
 
3.2 TFP growth measures 
TFP growth estimates are derived directly through growth accounting. A Cobb Douglas 
production function of the following form is assumed: 
               Yi,t = Ai,t (Ki,t)
α
(Li,t)
(1-a)
            (1) 
where Yi,t represents GDP of each country i in period t, K is the physical capital stock of 
each country and L is the labor input, measured in total hours worked. A is a labor and 
capital neutral technology parameter, associated with TFP, t is a time index and a is the 
income share of capital, which varies across countries and time.  
The data for growth accounting were taken from the Penn World Table 8.0 
Database (see Feenstra et al. 2013). Values for output and physical capital are in 2005 
chained PPP dollars. The income shares of capital and labor, a and 1-a, were measured 
directly with the use of labor compensation data (provided by the Penn World Table 8.0 
Database). The variable of total hours worked is measured as the product of average 
hours per person by the number of persons engaged. 
After taking logarithms and differentiating both sides of Equation (1), we obtain: 
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Equation (2) indicates the main sources of growth of an economy.
1
 In particular, 
the growth rate of output, ln(Yi,t/Yi,t-1), comprises of three main components: the growth 
rate of hours worked,
 
ln(Li,t/Li,t-1), multiplied by its income share (1-a), the growth rate 
of capital, ln(Ki,t/Ki,t-1), multiplied by its income share (a) and TFP growth, ln(Ai,t/Ai,t-1). 
                                                 
1
 It is assumed that inputs are paid according to their marginal products and therefore the income shares 
of labor and capital sum up to 1. 
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TFP is the part of output growth, not attributable to inputs and includes among others 
technological change and the efficiency with which the inputs are used. 
Average estimates of TFP growth and TFP growth contribution are reported in 
Table 2. The highest TFP growth rates over the entire period are reported for Ireland, 
Germany and Japan. On the contrary, Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland have 
experienced quite low or even negative TFP growth rates during this period. We also 
observe that in most countries output growth is mainly driven by the high contribution 
of TFP growth. This evidence confirms the findings of Jones and Olken (2008) having 
shown that shifts in the growth process are largely due to changes in productivity 
growth and do not rely on changes in the factors of production. Prescott (1998) has also 
argued that TFP is the basic determinant of income differences across the world 
economy. Comparable evidence has been offered by Kehoe and Prescott (2002), 
indicating that the rate of TFP can adequately explain long economic periods of many 
developed countries.  
Direct measures of TFP levels for each country i at time t are obtained by: 
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Relying on that TFP levels are the highest in the US for each year of this period, the 
technology gap for each country i emerges as its level of TFP relative to the level of 
TFP in the US economy: 
                                              Technology gap = )ln(
,
,
ti
tUS
TFP
TFP
                                   (4) 
A high value of the technology gap indicates that a country remains far away from the 
technology frontier, while a low value shows that this country operates close to the 
frontier.  
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4 Econometric estimates 
4.1 Time series analysis 
Given that the length of the time span covered by the sample is high, we first assess 
stationarity in the data and then investigate for the presence of a cointegrating 
relationship between the variables of regulation and TFP. We use the panel unit root test 
of Maddala and Wu (1999) which allows for the presence of heterogeneity. We also use 
the second generation panel unit root test of Pesaran (2007) that accounts for cross 
sectional dependence in the data. For each variable in its levels (TFP, Index of 
regulation, technology gap), Table 3 displays the value of the test and the associated p-
value under the null hypothesis that the series are I(1). For a wide array of tests 
regarding the number of chosen lags and the existence or not of a stochastic trend, the 
majority of the results suggest that the variables are stationary in their first differences.  
To investigate the presence of cointegration between the variables of TFP and 
regulation, we use four panel cointegrating tests proposed by Westerlund (2007). These 
tests examine for cointegration within a selected group of the panel (Gt and Ga) or for 
the panel as a whole (Pt and Pa) and control for cross sectional dependence in the data. 
After performing a variety of tests regarding the number of chosen lags and the 
existence or not of a trend, we can infer that the variables of TFP and regulation are 
cointegrated, as the null of no cointegration is rejected in most of the tests presented in 
Table 4. It should be noticed that bootstrapped critical values have been used and robust 
p-values are reported in Table 4. 
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4.2 Econometric model 
The general empirical model used to study the relation between TFP and regulation 
follows Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and Aghion and Howitt (2006) and can be 
expressed in the following way:  
ΔlnTFPi,t= αΔlnTFPUSA,t + βTG i,t-1 + γΔREGi,t + δΔREGi,t* REGi,t + θREGi,t* TGi,t-1+ ei,t  (5) 
where indices i and t denote country and year, respectively. For each country i we 
assume that TFP growth depends on its ability to keep pace with the technology 
frontier. Therefore ΔlnTFPi,t of each country i is modeled as a function of TFP growth 
of USA (ΔlnTFPUSA,t) which is considered as the leader economy.  
ΔlnTFPi,t also depends on the size of the technology gap between the follower 
and the leader. The variable of the technology gap (TGi,t-1) is derived from Equation (4) 
and enters Equation (5) lagged once so as to reduce the impact of multicollinearity.  
According to neo-Schumpeterian models of growth, if technology is free to flow across 
countries, then productivity growth is a positive function of the technology gap between 
the follower and the leader country, which is often referred as the catch-up 
phenomenon. Therefore, if coefficient β is positive and statistically significant, this 
implies the existence of high potential for technological convergence.  
By considering the REG indicator, we wish to search for the existence of any 
effects of regulation on TFP growth. The impact of regulations can be measured, also, 
indirectly by including in the regression the terms of ΔREGi,t*REGi,t and REGi,t*TGi,t-1. 
The first multiplicative term allows the change of regulation variable (ΔREG) to interact 
with the level of regulation (REG). A negative coefficient on γ and a positive coefficient 
on δ would be interpreted as a negative effect of regulation of productivity which 
diminishes at high levels of regulation. The second term allows for the regulation 
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variable (REG) to interact with the level of technology gap (TG). A positive coefficient 
on θ would imply that the damaging effects of regulation are more intense in countries 
with low technology gaps. 
As evidenced by the results shown in Table 4, there is a long run cointegrating 
relationship between regulation and TFP. Therefore, Equation (5) can be re-
parameterized to include a long run equilibrium vector between these two variables: 
ΔlnTFPi,t  = αΔlnTFPUSA,t + βTG i,t-1 + γΔREGi,t + δΔREGi,t* REGi,t + θREGi,t* TGi,t-1  
+φ (lnTFPi,t-1+ β1REGi,t-1) + ei,t          (6)   
The coefficient β1 measures the long run effect of regulation on TFP while φ is the error 
correction speed of adjustment. This parameter is expected to be negative in order for 
variables to return to their long run equilibrium. 
 
4.3 Baseline estimates 
Turning to the estimation strategy, estimation of Equation (6) is carried out using the 
pooled mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) which is suitable when 
analyzing panel data with a large time series and a large cross section dimension. In 
contrast to traditional panel data estimators, where homogeneity of coefficients is 
assumed, the pooled mean group estimator allows the short run coefficients to differ 
across countries, while long run effects are assumed to be identical across countries. 
Thereby, this estimator obtains an estimate of the long run impact of regulation on TFP 
growth, which is common for all countries, without imposing the restrictive assumption 
of identical short run dynamics. Also, by using this estimator, we account for possible 
feedback effects. Although it is possible that regulation adversely affects productivity 
through channels related to inefficiency and misallocation of resources, it might also be 
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that low productivity growth could lead to policy changes in the direction of lower 
regulation in the markets. Before discussing the econometric results, it should be 
noticed that Table 5 reassures us that no serious multicolineraity problem arises 
between independent variables of our model. 
Table 6 presents baseline estimates for the whole sample of OECD countries. 
Each column gives the average long run effect of regulation and the mean coefficient 
estimate of the error correction term, denoted by φ. The results of the Hausman test 
show that equality between the mean group and the pooled mean group estimates is not 
rejected in all econometric specifications and suggest that the pooled mean group 
estimator is the most appropriate choice to estimate Equation (6).
2
  
Column 1 reports the results when the identification strategy involves only 
regulation variables. The results suggest clearly that product market regulation is 
negatively associated with TFP. Likewise, the coefficient estimate for the short run 
effect of regulation is negative and statistically significant. Expectedly, the error 
correction parameter (φ) is significantly negative suggesting that the variables of TFP 
growth and regulation return to their long run equilibrium levels. Columns 2-3 of Table 
6 present econometric estimates after successively including in the model TFP growth 
of the leader country (USA) to account for the impact of outward shifts in the 
technological frontier and the variable of technology gap to allow for convergence 
effects. Expectedly their impact is positive and statistically significant. 
In column 3, we present the effect of the interaction of product market regulation 
with the technology gap variable. Thus, we introduce a multiplicative term. Given that 
                                                 
2
 The choice between the mean group and pooled mean group implies a consistency-efficiency tradeoff. 
The mean group estimator provides consistent estimates of the mean of long run coefficients, however it 
is less efficient as compared to the pooled mean group estimator. If homogeneity of long run coefficients 
holds, then the pooled mean group estimator is consistent and efficient. 
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the correlation between the variables and their interaction term might be high, the 
variables are mean centered (new variables are generated by subtracting their means). In 
such a way, we are allowed to interpret the coefficient of product market regulation at 
the average level of the technology gap rather than at the point where the technology 
gap is zero. Table 5 confirms that no serious multicolineraity problem arises between 
the variables of regulation, technology gap and their multiplicative term. The results 
show that the interaction term enters the estimated equation with a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. This implies that in countries where the technology 
gap vis-a-vis the US is high the damaging effect of regulation on productivity is 
inferior.  
We also check whether the impact of changes in regulation is affected by the 
level of regulation. Therefore, we introduce an interaction variable between the level of 
regulation and the change in regulation. Again we mean center the respective variables 
to reduce the impact of multicollinearity and provide results at the mean of the 
regulatory variable. The results (column 4) reinforce the conclusion that a high level of 
regulation increases the impact of a change towards liberlization. Column 5 presents 
estimates when both interaction terms enter Equation (6). The results confirm that 
product market regulation is negatively associated with TFP. The coefficient estimate 
for the short run effect of regulation lowers in magnitude but remains statistically 
significant at the level 10%. The impact of the rest of the control variables practically 
remains unchanged. 
The long run coefficient estimates of the variable of regulation are negative and 
statistically significant across all econometric specifications with its values ranging 
between -0.21 and -0.31 across specifications. If we consider the estimates shown in 
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column 5, then a reduction of 1% in the degree of regulation would bring a 0.21% 
average increase of TFP. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that a high 
level of regulation induces inefficiencies and leads to high price levels. These in turn 
lead to increases in the cost of production for sectors that use intensively as intermediate 
inputs the services provided by the sectors of energy, transports and communications. 
With the exception of results shown in column 3, all other econometric estimates shown 
in Table 6 indicate that the short run estimate of the coefficient of regulation is negative 
and statistically significant.  
 
4.4 Alternative measures of regulation 
We now turn to provide some robustness analysis conducted on model of column 5 
(Table 6) which is our preferred model specification. First, we validate our estimates by 
utilizing two different measures for regulation. Specifically, we use the public 
ownership index, as well as an index showing the extent of entry regulation. Both of 
these indices have been derived from the Product Market Regulation Database of 
OECD. The entry regulation index covers the extent of legal limitations on the number 
of firms in a sector, as well as rules on vertical integration of network industries. When 
entry is free, this indicator receives the value of 0. On the contrary, this indicator takes 
the value of 6 in cases where entry is heavily regulated. Similarly, the public ownership 
indicator takes the value of 0 in cases that there is no public ownership, and 6 in the 
case of full public ownership.  
In brief, the results of Table 7 confirm the existence of a significantly negative 
long-term relationship between public ownership and TFP growth throughout the whole 
sample (columns 1-2). The estimates confirm that the influence of changes in public 
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ownership is higher in countries with already high levels of regulation. Also, the 
damaging effects of public ownership are more intense in countries with low technology 
gaps. However, estimates of columns 3 and 4 do not confirm the existence of a 
statistically significant relation between entry regulation on TFP.  
 
4.5 Endogenous TFP growth  
We also present results after deriving measures of TFP growth which control for TFP 
induced capital deepening.
3
 We follow Madsen (2010b) and Madsen et al. (2010), to 
model the production function in per worker terms in the following way: 
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Taking logs and differentiating the above equation yields the following output per 
worker growth equation: 
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where gY/L is labor productivity growth. The term gA is the growth rate of TFP and its 
contribution is magnified by the factor 1/(1-a) accounting for TFP induced capital 
deepening. That is, by adopting the above specification, we allow for TFP to contribute 
to growth directly through technological progress and higher efficiency, as well as 
indirectly through the channel of capital deepening. The results are presented in 
columns 5-6 of table 7 and reassure us that lower regulations exert a significantly 
positive effect on TFP in the long run. We also confirm that the influence of regulatory 
                                                 
3
 It has been argued that relying on a standard growth accounting framework would neglect endogenous 
formation of capital deepening and attribute TFP only to its direct effect on growth (Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare 1997; Prescott 1998; Barro 1999). Madsen (2010a) showed that standard growth 
accounting exercises attribute too much growth to capital deepening.   
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changes is higher in countries with high levels of regulation and that the harmful effects 
of regulation are more intense in countries close to the productivity frontier.  
 
4.6 Sub-sample analysis 
Having found evidence that lower regulations exert a positive long run influence on 
TFP growth, we proceed to analyze whether this relationship holds in different samples. 
First, we divide countries into two subgroups to study whether the regulation 
productivity nexus matters different in low regulated and high regulated countries. The 
least regulated countries in our sample are the USA, UK, Canada, Australia, Sweden, 
Japan, Germany, New Zealand, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway and Netherlands while 
the most regulated countries are Austria, Spain, Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, 
Luxemburg, Portugal, Italy, France and Greece. The main results (columns 1-2 of Table 
8) can be summarized as follows: the long run impact of regulation remains negative 
and statistically significant only in low regulated countries. The coefficient of the 
technology the gap is positive and statistically significant in the group of high regulated 
economies. TFP growth of the leader country exerts a measurable and statistically 
significant effect in both groups of countries.  
We also check the stability of the obtained results by considering two individual 
sub-samples of countries, divided on the basis of whether they are close or far from the 
technology frontier. Based on the estimates of TFP levels, two groups of countries arise: 
the first one consists of more productive ones which are the USA, UK, Canada, 
Australia, Japan, Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland, Finland, Italy, France and Spain. 
The second group includes Austria, Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, Portugal, 
Greece, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The results of columns 3 and 4 
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clearly indicate the existence of a positive and significant long run effect of lower 
regulations on TFP in the sample of more productive countries. Similarly the coefficient 
of the technology gap is positive and statistically significant only in less productive 
countries. It is interesting to notice that the short run effects of regulation are negative 
and statistically significant in the group of more productive economies. Likewise the 
coefficient estimates of the interaction terms imply that in more productive economies a 
high level of regulation strengthens the negative impact of a regulatory change. 
 
4.7 Graphical illustrations 
To get an insight into the effects of regulatory changes we assess its contribution at 
various levels of regulation. Based on estimates shown in the last column of Table 6, we 
observe that the influence of regulatory changes is negative throughout the entire range 
of values of the index of regulation (Figure 1). However, the higher the value of the 
index of regulation the highest are its damaging effects on productivity.  
Similarly, Figure 2 reveals that the impact of regulation on productivity is 
negative across the range of values of the technology gap. However, the damaging 
effects are higher in countries with low technology gaps. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
The main purpose of this paper was to assess the impact of regulation on TFP. The 
econometric results were based on a sample of 23 OECD countries for the period 1975-
2007. A unique feature of this study was the distinction between short run and long run 
effects as well as the assessment of non linear influences of regulation. The empirical 
findings clearly suggest that lower product market regulation is important for long run 
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increase of TFP. Importantly the influence of regulatory changes is reinforced in 
countries with already high levels of regulation. Also, the damaging effects of 
regulation are more intense in countries with low technology gaps. 
On the contrary, short run effects of regulation on productivity are not always 
statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with the view that the effects of 
lower regulation are expected with a time lag as in the period shortly after deregulation 
its impact might be negligible due to adjustment costs. These findings are robust across 
different specifications.  
The findings of this study clearly indicate that institutions that promote lower 
regulation are important for higher productivity. A key mechanism through which lower 
regulation increases productivity is the reallocation of resources and output towards 
most efficient production units. Therefore, any improvement in the conditions of 
conduct of competition should be considered as a policy aimed at increasing long term 
productivity and economic growth. The impact of regulation on productivity is an issue 
which remains open for further research, as regards its influence in countries with 
different institutional characteristics, such as bureaucracy and corruption. 
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Tables & Figures 
 
TABLE 1 REGULATION INDEX IN ENERGY, TRANSPORTS AND 
COMMUNICATIONS (1975-2011)  
 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 
United Kingdom 4.86 4.86 4.53 3.50 2.31 1.55 1.12 0.80 
Germany 5.38 5.38 5.39 5.00 3.95 2.16 1.43 1.28 
Australia 4.10 4.10 4.10 4.10 3.53 2.06 1.86 1.52 
Netherlands 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.37 4.16 2.43 1.90 1.58 
Denmark 5.49 5.49 5.49 4.85 3.95 2.66 1.95 1.60 
Spain 5.38 5.36 5.36 5.14 4.36 3.22 1.97 1.63 
Austria 5.50 5.50 5.50 4.57 4.21 3.13 2.04 1.65 
Canada 4.53 4.53 4.39 3.21 2.74 1.80 1.78 1.73 
United States* 3.40 2.88 2.68 2.52 2.07 1.91 1.85 
 Japan 5.25 5.25 4.97 4.06 3.59 2.82 2.00 1.83 
Belgium 5.36 5.36 5.32 4.93 4.12 3.06 2.53 1.86 
Sweden 4.85 4.85 4.80 4.56 3.44 2.75 2.27 1.93 
Italy 5.98 5.98 5.92 5.92 5.15 3.93 2.57 2.01 
Iceland 5.33 5.34 5.34 5.34 4.75 3.39 2.07 2.01 
Ireland 5.67 5.67 5.67 4.92 4.57 3.83 3.17 2.21 
Switzerland 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.40 3.49 2.66 2.31 
Portugal 5.97 5.97 5.97 5.47 5.03 3.94 2.82 2.31 
Norway 5.39 5.39 4.96 4.65 3.69 3.24 2.38 2.33 
France 5.98 5.98 5.98 5.37 5.08 4.05 3.02 2.52 
Finland 5.76 5.72 5.58 5.01 3.65 3.11 2.69 2.53 
New Zealand 5.73 5.73 5.00 3.86 3.19 2.51 2.60 2.57 
Greece 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.52 4.81 3.80 2.57 
Luxembourg 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 4.90 3.52 2.90 2.78 
Source: Product Market Regulation Database-OECD.  Index values range between 0 and 6, from low to 
high degree of regulation.* Data for the USA end in 2007.   
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TABLE 2 TFP GROWTH RATES  
  1976-90 1990-2000 2000-11 1976-2011 
  
Average 
TFP growth 
Average 
TFP growth 
contribution 
Average 
TFP growth 
Average 
TFP growth 
contribution 
Average TFP 
growth 
Average 
TFP growth 
contribution 
Average 
TFP 
growth 
Average 
TFP growth 
contribution 
Canada -0.12% -3.58% 0.24% 9.89% -1.21% -118.12% -0.37% -15.96% 
New Zealand 0.94% 43.02% 1.07% 31.77% -1.00% -81.89% 0.37% 16.68% 
Switzerland 0.31% 14.69% 0.29% 13.37% 1.10% 40.06% 0.49% 21.88% 
Australia 0.68% 20.12% 1.34% 40.74% -0.51% -27.21% 0.61% 20.28% 
Iceland 1.77% 46.74% 0.62% 25.80% -0.52% -202.88% 0.71% 31.43% 
Sweden 0.44% 20.98% 1.77% 60.24% 0.61% 30.21% 0.80% 36.62% 
Portugal 1.40% 40.08% 0.97% 20.73% -0.47% -28.76% 0.81% 26.39% 
Belgium 1.38% 71.60% 1.68% 57.16% -0.03% -1.83% 0.84% 45.98% 
United States 0.93% 28.83% 1.37% 41.59% 0.64% 38.35% 0.95% 34.55% 
Spain 1.49% 64.04% 1.27% 26.43% 0.24% 7.67% 1.02% 32.85% 
Denmark 1.38% 63.61% 1.99% 59.85% 0.16% 16.49% 1.06% 54.03% 
Italy 1.87% 49.82% 1.62% 53.98% -0.10% -10.08% 1.13% 43.86% 
Greece 0.91% 36.97% 2.44% 59.89% 0.54% 29.32% 1.15% 43.72% 
Austria 1.03% 42.77% 2.62% 62.45% 0.70% 42.81% 1.26% 50.57% 
Luxembourg 2.31% 70.43% 2.69% 38.09% -1.09% -54.32% 1.26% 33.58% 
France 1.61% 76.98% 1.79% 62.28% 0.68% 40.29% 1.27% 62.55% 
Norway 1.95% 53.91% 2.88% 63.26% -0.29% -18.72% 1.28% 42.79% 
Netherlands 1.13% 57.33% 2.22% 51.02% 1.33% 55.08% 1.30% 52.98% 
Finland 1.59% 53.78% 2.25% 86.76% 0.60% 32.94% 1.41% 58.14% 
United Kingdom 1.74% 71.03% 2.27% 65.94% 0.39% 31.39% 1.43% 62.65% 
Germany 2.00% 75.43% 2.29% 66.57% 1.18% 61.20% 1.67% 66.50% 
Japan 2.05% 42.27% 1.94% 64.32% 1.32% 144.61% 1.67% 57.01% 
Ireland 2.67% 60.71% 4.04% 54.33% 0.90% 20.40% 2.39% 47.66% 
*Sorted by average TFP growth over the period 1976-2011. 
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TABLE 3 PANEL UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 Total factor productivity* Technology gap Index of regulation 
 
Maddala 
and Wu test 
(p-value) 
Pesaran test 
(p-value) 
Maddala 
and Wu test 
(p-value) 
Pesaran test 
(p-value) 
Maddala 
and Wu test 
(p-value) 
Pesaran test 
(p-value) 
Constant, no lag 13.37(1.00) -0.85 (0.19) 42.57 (0.53) -0.01 (0.49) 1.59 (1.00) 0.19 (0.57) 
Constant, 1 lag 17.75 (1.00) -2.13 (0.01) 47.00 (0.35) -1.99 (0.02) 2.57 (1.00) -0.84 (0.20) 
Constant, 2 lags 16.22 (1.00) -1.96 (0.02) 36.05 (0.79) -1.91 (0.03) 3.35 (1.00) 0.65 (0.74) 
Constant, trend, no lag 37.55 (0.74) 2.99 (0.99) 42.13(0.55) 0.55 (0.71) 19.01 (1.00) 0.13 (0.55) 
Constant, trend, 1 lag 60.20 (0.05) 1.31 (0.90) 39.86 (0.64) -1.70 (0.04) 21.69 (1.00) -1.09 (0.13) 
Constant, trend, 2 lags 53.93 (0.14) 1.76 (0.96) 29.10 (0.95) -0.65 (0.25) 22.29 (1.00) 0.57 (0.71) 
         1. Null hypothesis: Series are I (1), 2.*variable in logs 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 WESTERLUND PANEL COINTEGRATION TEST  
 
Gt (robust p-
value) 
Ga (robust p-
value) 
Pt (robust p-
value) 
Pa (robust p-
value) 
Constant, 1 lag -2.02 (0.13) -9.05 (0.05) -9.99 (0.06) -8.64 (0.01) 
Constant, 2 lags -1.99 (0.21) -8.96 (0.21) -8.80 (0.20) -8.51 (0.04) 
Constant, trend, 1 lag -3.05 (0.04) -18. 23 (0.03) -14.45 (0.03) -16.43 (0.02) 
Constant, trend, 2 lags -3.01 (0.08) -19. 20 (0.09) -13.15 (0.13) -15. 26 (0.16) 
1. Null Hypothesis: No Cointegration. 2. Bootstrapped p-values computed 
 
 
TABLE 5 CORRELATION TABLE OF ALL VARIABLES 
 
TFP 
growth 
Δ (Regulation) 
TFP growth 
USA 
Technology 
gap (t-1) 
Technology 
gap (t-1) × 
(Regulation) 
Δ (Regulation)× 
(Regulation) 
Regulation 
TFP growth 1.00 
      
Δ (Regulation) -0.08 1.00 
     
TFP growth USA 0.25 -0.10 1.00 
    
Technology gap (t-1) 0.11 -0.10 0.02 1.00 
   
Technology gap (t-1) 
× (Regulation) 
0.05 -0.10 0.00 0.09 1.00 
  
Δ (Regulation)× 
(Regulation) 
0.02 -0.27 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 1.00 
 
Regulation 0.20 0.21 0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.22 1.00 
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TABLE 6 BASELINE ESTIMATES  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Error Correction 
Coefficient (φ) 
-0.010** 
(-2.28) 
-0.009** 
(-1.98) 
-0.012** 
(-2.21) 
-0.010** 
(-2.13) 
-0.013** 
(-2.14) 
Long run coefficients 
Regulation  
-0.306** 
(-7.36) 
-0.304** 
(-7.02) 
-0.248** 
(-2.50) 
-0.311** 
(-7.67) 
-0.217** 
(-2.12) 
Short run coefficients 
Constant term 
0.134** 
(2.29) 
0.116** 
(2.14) 
0.116* 
(1.67) 
0.131** 
(2.11) 
0.123* 
(1.68) 
Δ (Regulation) 
-0.015** 
(-3.22) 
-0.011** 
(-2.45) 
-0.005 
(-1.16) 
-0.015** 
(-3.23) 
-0.007* 
(-1.66) 
TFP growth USA  
0.507** 
(6.34) 
0.437** 
(5.51) 
0.503** 
(6.45) 
0.440** 
(5.66) 
Technology gap (t-1)   
0.006** 
(2.81) 
 
0.006** 
(2.48) 
Technology gap (t-1) 
× (Regulation) 
  
0.004** 
(2.22) 
 
0.003* 
(1.84) 
Δ (Regulation)× 
(Regulation) 
   
-0.002** 
(-3.19) 
-0.002** 
(-1.97) 
No. of observations 792 792 792 792 792 
No. of countries 22 22 22 22 22 
Log Likelihood 1907.22 1953.20 1994.46 1959.74 2004.11 
Hausman test (p-
value) 
1.44 
(0.23) 
0.54 
(0.46) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
0.14 
(0.71) 
0.15 
(0.69) 
1.  The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.    
2. **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.  
3.  The Hausman test is a test of poolability of the long run coefficients (all countries  
share the same long run elasticity). The null hypothesis accepts homogeneity of long  
run coefficients.  
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TABLE 7 ROBUSTNESS ESTIMATES  
 
Public ownership Entry regulation 
Alternative TFP 
growth measure 
Error Correction 
Coefficient (φ) 
-0.011** 
(-2.51) 
-0.013** 
(-2.77) 
-0.008** 
 (-2.39) 
-0.009** 
 (-2.39) 
-0.019** 
(-2.02) 
-0.020** 
(-1.99) 
Long run coefficients 
Regulation  
-0.233* 
(-1.83) 
-0.224* 
(-1.77) 
0.078 
 (0.56) 
0.022 
 (0.19) 
-0.279** 
(-3.01) 
-0.239** 
(-2.45) 
Short run coefficients 
Constant term 
0.104* 
(1.91) 
0.125** 
(2.22) 
 0.037 
(1.15) 
0.051 
 (1.31) 
0.185 
(1.52) 
0.197 
(1.56) 
Δ (Regulation) 
-0.002 
(-0.40) 
-0.017** 
(-2.80) 
-0.004 
 (-1.38) 
-0.004 
 (-1.17) 
-0.009 
(-1.18) 
-0.013 
(-1.61) 
TFP growth USA 
0.416** 
(4.90) 
0.400** 
(4.68) 
0.429** 
 (5.87) 
0.442** 
 (5.93) 
0.401** 
(5.16) 
0.404** 
(5.26) 
Technology gap (t-1) 
0.007** 
(2.86) 
0.007** 
(2.49) 
0.009** 
 (3.33) 
 0.009** 
(3.49) 
0.009** 
(2.58) 
0.009** 
(2.27) 
Technology gap (t-1) 
× (Regulation) 
0.004** 
(2.31) 
0.003** 
(2.05) 
0.001 
 (1.27) 
0.001 
 (1.27) 
0.005* 
(1.93) 
0.005 
(1.61) 
Δ (Regulation)× 
(Regulation) 
 
-0.004** 
(-4.41) 
 
-0.001 
 (-0.77) 
 
-0.003* 
(-1.92) 
No. of observations 792 792 792 792 792 792 
No. of countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Log Likelihood 1997.32 2009.36 1993.41 2004.51 1602.30 1612.55 
Hausman test (p-
value) 
1.09 
(0.29) 
0.03 
(0.87) 
0.10 
 (0.74) 
 2.30 
(0.12) 
5.25 
(0.02) 
2.72 
(0.01) 
1. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 2. **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 3. The 
Hausman test is a test of poolability of the long run coefficients (all countries share the same long run 
elasticity). The null hypothesis accepts homogeneity of long run coefficients.  
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TABLE 8 SUB SAMLPE ANALYSIS 
 Low 
regulated 
countries 
High 
regulated 
countries 
Low TFP 
countries 
High TFP 
countries 
Error Correction 
Coefficient (φ) 
 -0.017** 
(-2.26) 
-0.003** 
(-2.97) 
-0.012* 
 (-1.77) 
-0.011* 
(-1.77) 
Long run coefficients 
Regulation  
-0.314** 
 (-3.69) 
0.645 
(0.49) 
0.083 
 (0.32) 
-0.604** 
(-12.91) 
Short run coefficients 
Constant term 
0.189 
 (1.06) 
-0.012 
(-0.70) 
0.035 
 (0.50) 
0.185 
(1.30) 
Δ (Regulation) 
-0.007 
 (-1.14) 
-0.009 
(-1.23) 
0.0006 
 (0.11) 
-0.015** 
(-2.89) 
TFP growth USA 
0.621** 
 (6.75) 
0.250** 
(2.07) 
0.426** 
 (3.07) 
0.449** 
(4.87) 
Technology gap (t-1) 
0.004 
 (1.21) 
0.007** 
(2.53) 
0.015** 
 (2.71) 
-0.004 
(-1.17) 
Technology gap (t-1) 
× (Regulation) 
0.003 
 (1.07) 
0.002 
(1.09) 
0.002 
 (0.98) 
0.003 
(0.80) 
Δ (Regulation)× 
(Regulation) 
-0.003** 
 (-2.15) 
-0.0008 
(-0.74) 
-0.0007 
 (-0.43) 
-0.004** 
(-2.89) 
No. of observations 396 396 396 396 
No. of countries 11 11 11 11 
Log Likelihood 1055.82 948.83 933.78 1077.28 
Hausman test (p-
value) 
1.23 
 (0.26) 
1.19 
(0.27) 
1.16 
 (0.28) 
0.00 
(0.94) 
1. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 2. **Significant at 5%, *Significant at  
10%. 3. The Hausman test is a test of poolability of the long run coefficients (all  
countries share the same long run elasticity). The null hypothesis accepts homogeneity  
of long run coefficients.  
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FIGURE 1 Impact of regulatory changes at various levels of regulation  
 
 
FIGURE 2 Impact of regulation at various levels of the technology gap  
 
 
